Bibliography on Adaptive Logics:

Applications       [Table of contents]
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[Bat85b]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Meaning, acceptance, and dialectics. In Pitt [Pit85], pages 333-360. [scan]
Uses results from [Bat89a] to ague for the viability of a contextual approach to meaning, problem solving, and acceptance in the sciences.

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[Bat86b]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Static and dynamic paraconsistent logics and their use in expert systems. CC-AI, 3:33-50, 1986.
Uses results from [Bat89a] and [Bat86a] to ague that inconsistency-adaptive logics are superior to monotonic logics for letting a computer handle inconsistent data.

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[Bat89b]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Leo Apostel on dialectical logic. In Vandamme and Pinxten [VP89], pages 24-55.
Studies Apostel's contribution to dialectical logical mechanisms. Compares with and partly explicates them in terms of inconsistency-adaptive logics.

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[Bat94]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Inconsistency-adaptive logics and the foundation of non-monotonic logics. Logique et Analyse, 145:57-94, 1994. Appeared 1996. [scan]
Abstract
This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed non-monotonic logics.

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[Bat99d]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Paraconsistency and its relation to worldviews. Foundations of Science, 3:259-283, 1999. [scan]
Abstract
The paper highlights the import of the paraconsistent movement, list some motivations for its origin, and distinguishes some stands with respect to paraconsistency. It then discusses some sources of inconsistency that are specific for worldviews, and the import of the paraconsistent turn for the worldviews enterprise.
Special attention is paid to the need for an inconsistency-adaptive approach in the present context.

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[Bat01a]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A dynamic characterization of the pure logic of relevant implication. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30:267-280, 2001. [scan]
Abstract
This paper spells out a dynamic proof format for the pure logic of relevant implication. (A proof is dynamic if a formula derived at some stage need not be derived at a later stage.) The paper illustrates three interesting points. (i)~A set of properties that characterizes an inference relation on the (very natural) dynamic proof interpretation, need not characterize the same inference relation (or even any inference relation) on the usual set-theoretical interpretation. (ii)~A proof format may display an internal dynamics (defeasible conclusions) in the absence of an external dynamics (non-monotonicity). (iii)~A monotonic logic may have a non-monotonic characterization.

Keywords: dynamic proofs, relevant implication, non-monotonicity.
The paper relies on a Tarski-like characterization of the pure logic of relevant implication that was presented in [Bat87].

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[Bat99a]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Contextual problem solving and adaptive logics in creative processes. Philosophica, 64:7-31, 1999. Appeared 2001. [scan]
Abstract
Creativity is commonly seen as beyond the scope of rationality. In the present paper, it is argued that available insights in epistemology and available results in logic enable us to incorporate creativity within an independently sensible view on human rationality.

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[Bat04c]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. The need for adaptive logics in epistemology. In Gabbay et al. [GRSB04], pages 459-485. [scan]
Abstract
After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.
Part of the interest of this paper lies in the fact that a set of properties is proved for a very large set of adaptive logics.

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[Bat05c]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. The theory of the process of explanation generalized to include the inconsistent case. Synthese, 143:63-88, 2005. this paper
Abstract
This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper [HH05]. The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.
As appears from the abstract, this is a strong generalization of Hintikka's theory. It proceeds in terms of ACLuN1 from [Bat99b].

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[Bat04a]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. The basic inductive schema, inductive truisms, and the research-guiding capacities of the logic of inductive generalization. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:53-84, 2004. Appeared 2005.

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[Bat06b]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Narrowing down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets. In Malinowski and Pietruszczak [MP06], pages 185-209. [scan]
Abstract
Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.

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[Batntb]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Aspects of the dynamics of discussions and logics handling them. Logical Studies, in print. [ps.zip] [pdf]
Abstract
Although we are all familiar with discussions, spelling out their dynamics in a precise way involves many tough logical problems. This paper reports on a set of logical tools that are useful in this respect. Some concern the arguments produced in a discussion, possibly as a result of interventions of different participants, and the many forms of explicit and implicit agreement that are required to understand what is going on. Others concern the changing positions of participants. Nearly all of the tools are adaptive logics.

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[Bat07a]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Content guidance in formal problem solving processes. In Pombo and Gerner [PG07], pages 121-156.
Abstract
In this paper, a formal framework to problem-solving processes is presented. The framework is not complete. Nevertheless, even its present sophistication allows one to see that it is promising.\par The framework demonstrably allows one to understand scientific change as content-guided. It will be argued that a formal framework is required in order to make definite and precise statements about the content-guided aspects of scientific problem solving.

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[BM01a]    [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Joke Meheus. On the logic and pragmatics of the process of explanation. In Kiikeri and Ylikoski [KY01]. 22 pp. [this paper]
Abstract
In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.

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[DCV04]    [bibitem]
Kristof De Clercq and Liza Verhoeven. Sieving out relevant and efficient questions. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:53-84, 2004. Appeared 2005.

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[DVW04]    [bibitem]
Leen De Vreese and Erik Weber. Applications of the adaptive logic for causal discovery. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:33-51, 2004. Appeared 2005.

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[DVW]    [bibitem]
Leen De Vreese and Erik Weber. Searching for singular causal explanations: a formal analysis. to appear.

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[Kliar]    [bibitem]
Alex Klijn. Using classical resolution method to check derivability for some propositional paralogics and adative logics. to appear.
Abstract
In this article will be shown how results from [BDCK99] can be used to decide wether, for a range of propositional paralogics and adaptive logics L, A1, ..., An \vdashL B is derivable by means of a resolution method for C1, ..., Cn \vdashCL D, where C1, ..., Cn and D are the translations of the original premisses and the conclusion respectively from L into CL. This method simplifies the use of automated deduction for non-classical logics, since the framework for these logics can be put "on top of" any existing resolution method for classical logic. This theoretical framework has been implemented in a computer program. The URL where this program is available will be given. This approach, moreover, makes it easier to compare the derivability of well formed formulas from sets of premisses between the implemented range of logics. The resulting computer program can thus be seen as an useful tool for research in logics.

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[Meh93]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Adaptive logic in scientific discovery: the case of Clausius. Logique et Analyse, 143-144:359-389, 1993. Appeared 1996.
Abstract

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[Meh95]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Nieuwe perspectieven voor het begrijpen en bevorderen van creativiteit. Mores, 40:164-178, 1995.
Abstract

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[Meh99b]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativity. Foundations of Science, 4:325-336, 1999.
Abstract

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[Meh99c]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Model-based reasoning in creative processes. In Magnani et al. [MNT99], pages 199-217.
Abstract

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[Meh00a]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Analogical reasoning in creative problem solving processes: Logico-philosophical perspectives. In Hallyn [Hal00], pages 17-34.
Abstract

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[Meh02c]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Inconsistencies in scientific discovery. Clausius’s remarkable derivation of Carnot’s theorem. In Krach et al. [KVM02], pages 143-154.
Abstract

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[Meh99d]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. The positivists’ approach to scientific discovery. Philosophica, 64:81-108, 1999. Appeared 2001.
Abstract

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[Meh99a]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Clausius’ discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistencies. Philosophica, 63:89-117, 1999. Appeared 2001.
Abstract

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[Meh00c]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. On the acceptance of problem solutions derived from inconsistent constraints. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 8:33-46, 2000. Appeared 2002. [scan]
Abstract

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[Meh02b]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. How to reason from inconsistencies. In Inconsistency in Science [Meh02d], pages 151-164.
Abstract

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[Meh05]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logics. In Festa et al. [FAP05], pages 193-217.
Abstract

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[Meh04]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Adaptive logics and the integration of induction and deduction. In Stadler [Sta04], pages 93-120.
Abstract

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[MB96]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus and Diderik Batens. Steering problem solving between cliff incoherence and cliff solitude. Philosophica, 58:153-187, 1996. Appeared 1998. [scan]
Abstract
Starting from Nickles' constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.

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[MP04]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus and Dagmar Provijn. Direct dynamic proofs for classical compatibility. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:305-317, 2004. Appeared 2005.
Abstract
In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

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[MP07]    [bibitem]
Joke Meheus and Dagmar Provijn. Abduction through semantic tableaux versus abduction through goal-directed proofs. Theoria, 22/3(60):295-304, 2007.
Abstract

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[Pri87]    [bibitem]
Graham Priest. In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987.
Abstract

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[Pri06]    [bibitem]
Graham Priest. In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. Second expanded edition (first edition 1987).

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[PW02]    [bibitem]
Dagmar Provijn and Erik Weber. Adaptive logics for non-explanatory and explanatory diagnostic reasoning. In Magnani et al. [MNP02], pages 117-142. [scan]
Abstract
In this paper we confine ourselves to diagnosis of faults in systems. The latter are understood as structured wholes of components. Three types of diagnosis can be distinguished and are defined : non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. After the analysis of the reasoning process that leads to non-explanatory diagnosis, we argue that the predicative adaptive logic Dnexp is an adequate tool for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. Subsequently we follow the same pattern for weak and strong diagnosis and describe the logic Dexp which adequately formalizes weak diagnostic reasoning, even when underlying theoretical knowledge is taken into account. Finally it is argued that the same logic can be applied in the case of strong diagnostic reasoning whenever a number of conditions are fulfilled.

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[Van01]    [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. The role of ambiguities in the construction of collective theories. Logique et Analyse, 173-174-175:189-214, 2001. Appeared 2003.
Abstract
The paper presents a formal model for theory development, based on a very intuitive ambiguity-adaptive logic. Apart from its simplicity, the model has some interesting features. (i) It allows for the construction of theories that cannot rely on observational data. (ii) It allows to construct a theory starting from zero, and using a small set of predicates. (iii) The model establishes that there is no real difference between the construction of scientific theories and the development of everyday knowledge.

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[VD04]    [bibitem]
Maarten Van Dyck. Causal discovery using adaptive logics. Towards a more realistic heuristics for human causal learning. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:5-32, 2004. Appeared 2005.
Abstract

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[VKVar]    [bibitem]
Bart Van Kerckhove and Guido Vanackere. Vagueness-adaptive logic: A pragmatical approach to sorites paradoxes. Studia Logica, To appear.
Abstract
This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.

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[Ver03a]    [bibitem]
Liza Verhoeven. Changing one’s position in discussions. Some adaptive approaches. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11-12:277-197, 2003.
Abstract
This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of one's interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the Rescher-Manor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step.

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[Verar]    [bibitem]
Timothy Vermeir. Inconsistency-adaptive arithmetic. To appear.

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[WDC02]    [bibitem]
Erik Weber and Kristof De Clercq. Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive. In Meheus [Meh02d], pages 165-184.
Abstract

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[WVnt]    [bibitem]
Erik Weber and Leen De Vreese. The causes and cures of scurvy. How modern was James Lind’s methodology? Logic and Logical Philosophy, in print.

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[WP99]    [bibitem]
Erik Weber and Dagmar Provijn. A formal analysis of diagnosis and diagnostic reasoning. Logique et Analyse, 165-166:161-180, 1999. Appeared 2002.
Abstract
Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

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[WVD01]    [bibitem]
Erik Weber and Maarten Van Dyck. Adaptive logic and covering law explanations. Logique et Analyse, 173-174-175:237-254, 2001. Appeared 2003.
Abstract
In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

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