

# Structured Proofs and Adaptive Logic

Patrick Allo<sup>1</sup>

Centre of Logic and Philosophy of Science  
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium  
patrick.allo@vub.ac.be

A central feature of adaptive logics is that for any provisional derivation of  $p$  based on  $\Gamma \vdash_{LLL} Dab(C_1, \dots, C_n) \vee p$ , it requires the normal behaviour of all  $C_i$  with respect to all premises in  $\Gamma$ , and not merely with respect to that subset  $\gamma \subseteq \Gamma$  from which  $p$  was initially derived (as reflected in a proof by the line numbers from which it is effectively derived). As long as  $\Gamma$  is considered as a theory, being a set of statements structured by at most a (total) preference ordering, this is a sensible approach towards provisional deductive steps.

The latter is, however, not always the case. Within several contexts it is, for instance, preferable to consider a set of premises as a structured set (e.g. a poset). Hereby we mean that a set of premises can be seen as a number of subsets that are not fully related, but which possibly share some of their premises. A few examples are : (i) discussions with an explicit structure - i.e. a (transitive) *reply-to* relation, (ii) alternative evolutions, (iii) mutually incompatible extensions of a theory.

In such a case, the strategy for provisional derivations within the adaptive logic framework should be modified in this way:  $\Gamma \vdash_{AL} p$  iff  $\gamma \vdash_{LLL} Dab(C_1, \dots, C_n) \vee p$  holds,  $\gamma \subseteq \Gamma$  whose elements are related, and the conditions on which  $p$  was derived behave normally with respect to  $\gamma'$ , the largest extension of  $\gamma$  with respect to the internal structure of  $\Gamma$ . The resulting consequence relation is weaker as its reach is only local, but it is also more versatile and yields a more fine-grained approach by validating more - but only locally valid - consequences.

One way of modelling this is to consider a structured set of premises as a labelled graph with premises as labelled nodes, and relations as (directed) labelled edges. Using modal semantics, such structures can be described in a straightforward way, and notions as ‘related premises’ and ‘largest extensions of subsets of premises’ can easily be formalised. When it comes to the formulation of the corresponding dynamic proof-formats, we have to deal with an additional problem, viz. the integration of relational structures within proofs. In this paper a labelled deductive system that solves the problem at the level of proofs is considered.

As a concrete example we focus on the case of discussions with an explicit structure, and show that this approach allows for the distinction of ‘lines of argument’ and ‘local agreements’ within a discussion. Furthermore we argue that the labelled approach, although yielding exactly the same consequences as a series of distinct proofs for every  $\gamma \subseteq \Gamma$ , is a useful and expressive extension of the regular dynamic proof-formats.

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<sup>1</sup>Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (Belgium).

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