Bibliography on Adaptive Logics / papers

Bibliography on Adaptive Logics:

Papers (and sections of books) on adaptive logics [Table of contents]

[All06] [bibitem]
Patrick Allo. Local informatyion and adaptive consequence. Logique et Analyse, 196:461-488, 2006.

Abstract
In this paper we provide a formal description of what it means to be in a local or partial information state. Starting from the notion of locality in a relational structure, we define so-called adaptive generated submodels. The latter are then shown to yield an adaptive logic wherein the derivability of $\Box$ A is naturally interpreted as a core property of being in a state in which one holds the information that A.

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[Bat85a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Dynamic dialectical logics as a tool to deal with and partly eliminate unexpected inconsistencies. In Hintikka and Vandamme [HV85], pages 263-271.

This paper was written after [Bat89a] and uses results from there.

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[Bat86a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Dialectical dynamics within formal logics. Logique et Analyse, 114:161-173, 1986. [scan]

First formulation, at the propositional level, of the semantic approach to the Minimal Abnormality strategy, which proceeds by selecting the models of the premises that are minimally inconsistent (a so-called preferential semantics). This approach was generalized to the predicative level in quite distinct ways in [Pri91] and [Bat99b].

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[Bat89a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Dynamic dialectical logics. In Priest et al. [PRN89], pages 187-217. [scan]

Oldest paper on the inconsistency-adaptive logics, written before 1980. Contains the basic idea and articulation, at the propositional level, of dynamic proofs. The Reliability strategy is first presented here. The results are extended to the predicative level in [Bat99b].

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[Bat96] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics. In Van Benthem et al. [VBVEGV96], pages 241-254. [scan]

Abstract
This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.

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[Bat97] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Inconsistencies and beyond. A logical-philosophical discussion. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 200:259-273, 1997. [scan]

Abstract
The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories `as normally as possible', even if they contain some abnormalities.

That all logical abnormalities surface as inconsistencies in classical logic caused classical logicians as well as paraconsistent logicians to be obsessed by inconsistencies. This obsession is here challenged.

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[Bat95] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Blocks. The clue to dynamic aspects of logic. Logique et Analyse, 150-152:285-328, 1995. Appeared 1997. [scan]

Abstract
The present paper introduces a new approach to formal logic. The block approach is especially useful to grasp dynamic aspects of reasoning, including formal reasoning, that fall beyond the reach of the usual approaches. A block language, the block analysis of proofs, and semantic systems in terms of blocks are articulated. The approach is first applied to classical logic (including proof heuristics). It is used to solve two important problems for adaptive logics (that have a dynamic proof theory). Some further applications are discussed, including meaning change.

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[Bat98b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A dynamic semantics for inconsistency-adaptive logics. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 27:15-18, 1998.

Short version of [Bat98a].

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[Bat98a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Dynamic semantics applied to inconsistency-adaptive logics. In Logical Investigations [LI998], pages 74-85.

See [Bat98b] for an abbreviated version.

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[Bat99b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Inconsistency-adaptive logics. In Orlowska [Orl99], pages 445-472. [scan]

Abstract
After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic CLuN obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.

Basic study of the two central inconsistency-adaptive logics. Generalization of [Bat89a] (the Reliability strategy) and [Bat86a] (the Minimal Abnormality strategy) to the predicative level.

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[Bat99e] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Zero logic adding up to classical logic. Logical Studies, 2:15, 1999. (Electronic Journal: http://www.logic.ru/LogStud/02/LS2.html).

Abstract
The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any non-logical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible. If the premises have classical models, the logic assigns them the same consequence set as Classical Logic.

The semantics of the logic is presented, the dynamic proof theory is hinted at, and some comments are added on the philosophical significance of the result.

The paper contains the formula to obtain corrective adaptive logics that allow for gluts, gaps, or both with respect to any logical symbol (including identity). Combining all of them with the ambiguity logic from [Van97] results in a lower limit logic in which even A $\vdash$ A does not hold, and an adaptive logic that still delivers all classical consequences for Gamma

that have classical models.

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[Bat00c] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A survey of inconsistency-adaptive logics. In Batens et al. [BMPVB00], pages 49-73.

Abstract
This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.

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[Bat00a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Minimally abnormal models in some adaptive logics. Synthese, 125:5-18, 2000. [scan]

Abstract
In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) non-standard logic PL, the consequences of Gamma

can be defined in terms of a selection of the PL-models of Gamma

. An important property of the adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, and ACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this is justified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). The property fails for Priest's LP^m because of its way of measuring the degree of abnormality of a model is incoherent---correcting this delivers the property.

Strong Reassurance is closely related to smoothness and stopperedness.

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[Bat00b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Rich inconsistency-adaptive logics. The clash between heuristic efficiency and realistic reconstruction. In Beets and Gillet [BG00], pages 513-543.

In [Bat89a] and elsewhere, it is argued that inconsistency-adaptive logics that have CLuN as their lower limit logic are more efficient than others for localizing inconsistencies, and that the latter is essential for applications to the empirical sciences. In [Meh97] and [Meh02b], it is argued that richer lower limit logics allow for a more realistic reconstruction of historical cases. These arguments are confronted in the present paper.

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[Bat99c] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Linguistic and ontological measures for comparing the inconsistent parts of models. Logique et Analyse, 165-166:5-33, 1999. Appeared 2002. [scan]

Abstract
Adaptive logics depend essentially on measures for the degree of abnormality of models. The linguistic approach to such measures compares the sets of abnormal, e.g., inconsistent wffs verified by the models. The ontological approach compares models in terms of `structural' properties that do not depend on the way in which the language is interpreted in the model.

While the linguistic approach has not been questioned up to now, present proposals for an ontological approach are affected by several weaknesses. The present paper argues for the attractiveness of an ontological approach and elaborates on the challenge to adequately define it. The final outcome is rather negative: the only sensible definition attained leads to a logic that does not seem to have any suitable application contexts.

Shows the inadequacy of the approach from [Pri91] and of possible variants of it.

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[Bat00d] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Towards the unification of inconsistency handling mechanisms. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 8:5-31, 2000. Appeared 2002. [scan]

Abstract
It is shown that the (flat) consequence relations defined from the Rescher-Manor Mechanism (that is: in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premises) are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics is obtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logic CLuN.

This result provides all those consequence relations with a (dynamic) proof theory and with a static (as well as a dynamic) semantics.

The idea for the characterization was triggered by [Van00b]. A different characterization (and extension) in terms of (modal) ampliative adaptive logics is presented in [Bat03b]. The drastic differences between both characterizations is discussed in the next to last section of [Bat02c].

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[Bat01c] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A universally abnormality-adaptive logic. In Logical Investigations [LI001], pages 256-265. Appeared 2002.

Abbreviated version of [Bat99e].

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[Bat02a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. In defence of a programme for handling inconsistencies. In Meheus [Meh02d], pages 129-150.

Abstract
This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

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[Bat02b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. On a partial decision method for dynamic proofs. In Decker et al. [DVW02], pages 91-108. Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html.

cs.LO/0207090 at http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html

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[Bat02d] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Some computational aspects of inconsistency-adaptive logics. CLE e-Prints, 2(7):15 pp., 2002. \verb"http://www.cle.unicamp.br/e-prints/abstract_16.html".

CLE e-Prints CLE e-Prints 2(7), 2002 -- reworked in [Bat05b].

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[Bat01b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A general characterization of adaptive logics. Logique et Analyse, 173-175:45-68, 2001. Appeared 2003. [scan]

Abstract
This paper contains a unified characterization of adaptive logics. The general structure is presented in the simplest possible guise, both for flat and prioritized adaptive logics. The latter are presented as a special case of combined adaptive logics. The aim of the paper is to provide the general framework underlying several other papers in this volume and to prepare the unified metatheory of adaptive logics.

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[Bat03a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Criteria causing inconsistencies. General gluts as opposed to negation gluts. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11/12:5-37, 2003. [scan]

Abstract
This paper studies the question: how should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare the approaches underlying several inconsistency-adaptive logics. I consider the Rescher--Manor consequence relations as well as adaptive logics defined from CLuN, CLuNs, LP, AN, and AL. The adaptive systems defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises.

Nevertheless, the systems based on CLuN introduce an asymmetry between negated and non-negated formulas that seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the problem, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all other logical constants. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the study of the properties of these systems.

While this resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN.

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[Bat04b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Extending the realm of logic. The adaptive-logic programme. In Weingartner [Wei04], pages 149-164. [scan]

Abstract
This paper reports on a development that involves a drastic broadening of the scope of symbolic logic. The central idea concerns dynamic proofs that explicate forms of reasoning for which no positive test is available. Two other forms of the dynamics of reasoning are briefly spelled out.

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[Bat05b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A procedural criterion for final derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics. Journal of Applied Logic, 3:221-250, 2005. online via ScienceDirect [scan]

Abstract
This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a \emph{criterion} for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

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[Bat03b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A strengthening of the Rescher-Manor consequence relations. Logique et Analyse, 183-184:289-313, 2003. Appeared 2005. [scan]

Abstract
The flat Rescher--Manor consequence relations---the Free, Strong, Weak, C-Based, and Argued consequence relation---are defined in terms of the classical consequences of the maximal consistent subsets of (possibly) inconsistent sets of premises. If the premises are inconsistent, the Free, Strong and C-Based consequence sets are consistent and the Argued consequence set avoids explicit inconsistencies (such as A and ~A).

The five consequence relations may be applied to discussive situations as intended by Jaskowski---the comparison with Jaskowski's D2 is instructive. The method followed by Joke Meheus to extend D2 to an adaptive logic, may also be applied to the Rescher--Manor consequence relations. It leads to an extension of the Free, Strong, Weak, and C-Based consequence relations. The extended consequence sets are consistent and closed under Classical Logic. Applying the method to the Argued consequence relation leads to a different consequence relation, not an extension. Neither the Argued consequence relation nor its extension appear very interesting in the present application context.

This paper contains a characterization of the Rescher-Manor consequence relations (and of their extensions) in terms of an ampliative adaptive logic that has S5 as its lower limit logic.

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[Bat05a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. On a logic of induction. In Festa et al. [FAP05], pages 221-242. (Contains uncorrected proofs; see [Bat06c] for correct version.).

Abstract
In this paper, I present a simple and straightforward logic of induction: a consequence relation characterized by a proof theory and a semantics. This system will be called LI. The premises will be restricted to, on the one hand, a set of empirical data and, on the other hand, a set of background generalizations. Among the consequences will be generalizations as well as singular statements, some of which may serve as predictions and explanations.

See [BH01] for a variant and extension in the standard format from [Bat01b].

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[Bat06c] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. On a logic of induction. L\&PS - Logic \& Philosophy of Science, IV(1):3-32, 2006. (Corrected version of [Bat05a].). (pdf)

Abstract

See [BH01] for a variant and extension in the standard format from [Bat01b].

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[Bat07b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. A universal logic approach to adaptive logics. Logica Universalis, 1:221-242, 2007. (ps-zipped) (pdf)

Abstract
In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the logics themselves.

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[Bat08] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. The role of logic in philosophy of science. In Psillos and Curd [PC08], pages 47-57. (ps-zipped) (pdf)

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[Bat0xa] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Adaptive Logics and Dynamic Proofs. A Study in the Dynamics of Reasoning. 200x. Forthcoming.

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[Batnta] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Towards a dialogic interpretation of dynamic proofs. In Dégremont et al. [DKR09].

Abstract
The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.

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[Bat0xb] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens. Adaptive C_n logics. 200x. pdf

Abstract
This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistency-adaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extra-logical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.

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[BM00a] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Joke Meheus. The adaptive logic of compatibility. Studia Logica, 66:327-348, 2000. [scan]

Abstract
This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for S5 from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worlds-models is characteristic for S5.

Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, S5-semantics.

The remarkable S5-semantics presented here is further systematized in the second section of [Batar].

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[BM00b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Joke Meheus. A tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics. In Dyckhoff [Dyc00], pages 127-142. [scan]

Abstract
We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.

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[BM01b] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Joke Meheus. Shortcuts and dynamic marking in the tableau method for adaptive logics. Studia Logica, 69:221-248, 2001. [scan]

Abstract
Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In [BM00b], we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision---the conclusion follows or does not follow---in a very economical way.

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[BM07] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Joke Meheus. Recent results by the inconsistency-adaptive labourers. In Béziau et al. [BCG07], pages 81-99. [ps.zip] [pdf]

Abstract
This paper offers an incomplete survey of recent results on inconsistency-adaptive logics (disregarding results on other adaptive logics). Much attention is paid to the so-called standard format, because it provides most of the required metatheory for adaptive logics that are phrased in this format. Combined adaptive logics are also briefly discussed. Other results reported on briefly concern (i)~rethinking some philosophical theories from a paraconsistent viewpoint, (ii)~the characterization of some (further) inconsistency-handling mechanisms in terms of adaptive logics, and (iii)~the problem of defining criteria for final derivability. The final section concerns a further step towards eliminating (undesired) inconsistencies from a theory.

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[BMPV03] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, Dagmar Provijn, and Liza Verhoeven. Some adaptive logics for diagnosis. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11/12:39-65, 2003. [scan]

Abstract
A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from [WP99] and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

This paper genezalizes the logics from [WP99], and presents a different kind of logics that have advantages for several forms of diagnosis.

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[BMPar] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, and Dagmar Provijn. An adaptive characterization of signed systems for paraconsistent reasoning. To appear. (ps-zipped) (pdf)

Abstract
In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from [BS98] in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.

Interestingly, the strategies required for the characterization of the different consequence relations are the same as those required for the characterization of the Rescher�Manor consequence relations (see [Bat00d]).

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[BDCVM09] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Kristof De Clercq, Peter Verdée, and Joke Meheus. Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complex. Synthese, 166:113-131, 2009. fulltext

Abstract
This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in [HW07]. It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.

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[BCVMnt] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Kristof De Clercq, Peter Verdé, and Joke Meheus. Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complex. Synthese, in print. fulltext

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[BDCVar] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Kristof De Clercq, and Guido Vanackere. Simplified dynamic proof formats for adaptive logics. To appear. [ps.zipped]

Abstract
Adaptive logics have a dynamic proof theory. The original proof theories were presented in terms of somewhat complex generic rules that vary from one logic to the other. In the present paper, we first present a simplified set of generic rules that apparently is suitable for any adaptive logic. Next, we present simple sets of rules for axiomatic proofs and for Fitch style proofs. Some formulations make dynamic proofs more transparent, others are more useful from a heuristic point of view.

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[BH01] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Lieven Haesaert. On classical adaptive logics of induction. Logique et Analyse, 173-175:255-290, 2001. Appeared 2003. [scan]

Abstract
This paper concerns the inference of inductive generalizations and of predictions derived from them. It improves on the adaptive logic of induction from [Bat05a] by presenting logics that are formulated strictly according to the usual adaptive standards. It moreover extends that paper with respect to background knowledge.

We present logics that handle inductive generalizations as well as logics that handle prioritized background knowledge of three kinds: background generalizations, pragmatic background generalizations (the instances of which may be invoked even after the generalizations are falsified), and background theories. All logics may be combined into a single system.

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[BP01] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Dagmar Provijn. Pushing the search paths in the proofs. A study in proof heuristics. Logique et Analyse, 173-175:113-134, 2001. Appeared 2003. [scan]

Abstract
Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for A₁, ..., A_n vdash

B and a positive test for Gamma

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[BSVar] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens, Christian Stra�er, and Peter Verdée. On the transparency of defeasible logics: Equivalent premise sets, equivalence of their extensions, and maximality of the lower limit. To appear. [pdf]

Abstract
For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that, the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.

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[BVar] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Guido Vanackere. Incompleteness-adaptive logics. to appear.

Abstract
We present results on two basic incompleteness-adaptive logics. These are the first published results on adaptive logics that are not inconsistency-adaptive. We offer some motivation, and present and study the underlying paracomplete logic as well as the incompleteness-adaptive logics, concentrating on their central justifying metatheoretic properties.

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[BV] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Peter Verdée. Content-guidance in the choice of a logic. Forthcoming.

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[BV02] [bibitem]
Diderik Batens and Timothy Vermeir. Direct dynamic proofs for the Rescher-Manor consequence relations: The flat case. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 12:63-84, 2002. [scan]

Abstract
It was shown in [Bat00d] that the flat Rescher--Manor consequence relations---the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, and Weak consequence relation---are all characterized by special applications of inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.

Oldest paper in which appears a dynamic proof theory formulated in terms of classical logic.

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[DC00] [bibitem]
Kristof De Clercq. Two new strategies for inconsistency-adaptive logics. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 8:65-80, 2000. Appeared 2002.

Abstract
In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistency-adaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategy of ACLuN3 and the minimally abnormal sufficient information strategy of ACLuN4. I give proof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also compare them with the well-known inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2.

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[DC05] [bibitem]
Kristof De Clercq. Logica in communicatie, volume 14 of Cahiers du Centre de Logique. Academia-Bruylant, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005.

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[D'H02] [bibitem]
Isabel D’Hanis. A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors. In Magnani et al. [MNP02], pages 21-37.

Abstract
In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously ``what metaphors are". Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.

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[D'H01] [bibitem]
Isabel D’Hanis. The use of metaphors in scientific development: A logical approach. Logique et Analyse, 173-175:215-235, 2001. appeared 2003.

Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the use of multiple metaphors plays an important part in scientific reasoning. It is more powerful in generating new ideas than the use of single metaphors. The aim of this paper is twofold. First I will argue by means of some historical examples, that the combination of metaphors adds a very specific type of dynamics, that makes them more powerful than single metaphors. Secondly, I will discuss an adaptive logic that grasps the use of multiple metaphors and that increases our insight in the reasoning process.

This paper builds on [D’H02].

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[Hae02] [bibitem]
Lieven Haesaert. Een adaptieve logica voor het beschrijven van inductie. In Handelingen van de 24ste Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie [HNV02], pages 137-144.

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[Haear] [bibitem]
Lieven Haesaert. Adaptive reasoning from incompatible background theories. to appear.

Abstract

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[HW07] [bibitem]
Leon Horsten and Philip Welch. The undecidability of propositional adaptive logic. Synthese, 158:41-60, 2007.

Abstract
.

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[Leu07] [bibitem]
Bert Leuridan. Supervenience: its logic and its inferential role in classical genetics. Logique et Analyse, 198:147-171, 2007.

Abstract
Supervenience is mostly conceived of as a purely philosophical concept. Nevertheless, I will argue, it played an important and very fruitful inferential role in classical genetics. Gregor Mendel assumed that phenotypic traits supervene on underlying factors, and this assumption allowed him to successfully predict and explain the phenotypical regularities he had experimentally discovered. Therefore it is interesting to explicate how we reason about supervenience relations.\\ I will tackle the following two questions. Firstly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found for inferring supervenience claims from data? Secondly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found to empirically test supervenience claims? I will answer these questions within the framework of the adaptive logics programme.

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[Leuar] [bibitem]
Bert Leuridan. Causal discovery and the problem of ignorance. an adaptive logic approach. Journal of Applied Logic, to appear.

Abstract

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[Meh00b] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. An extremely rich paraconsistent logic and the adaptive logic based on it. In Batens et al. [BMPVB00], pages 189-201.

Abstract

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[Meh02a] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. An adaptive logic for pragmatic truth. In Carnielli et al. [CCLD02], pages 167-185.

Abstract

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[Meh06a] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. An adaptive logic based on Jaskowski’s approach to paraconsistency. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35:539-567, 2006.

Abstract

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[Meh01] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Adaptive logics for question evocation. Logique et Analyse, 173-175:135-164, 2001. Appeared 2003.

Abstract

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[Meh06b] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Discussive adaptive logics: Handling internal and external inconsistencies. In Malinowski and Pietruszczak [MP06].

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[Meh03b] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Paraconsistent compatibility. Logique et Analyse, 183-184:251-287, 2003. Appeared 2005.

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[Meh03a] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus. Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? In Delrieux and Legris [DL03], pages 135-146.

Reconstruction of default logic by an adaptive logic under a modal translation.

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[MB06] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus and Diderik Batens. A formal logic for abductive reasoning. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 14:221-236, 2006. [this paper]

Abstract
This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.

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[MVVDP02] [bibitem]
Joke Meheus, Liza Verhoeven, Maarten Van Dyck, and Dagmar Provijn. Ampliative adaptive logics and the foundation of logic-based approaches to abduction. In Magnani et al. [MNP02], pages 39-71.

Abstract
In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

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[Nas04] [bibitem]
Marek Nasieniewski. An adaptive logic based on Jaskowski’s logic D_2. Logique et Analyse, 185-188:287-304, 2004. Appeared 2005.

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[Pri91] [bibitem]
Graham Priest. Minimally inconsistent LP. Studia Logica, 50:321-331, 1991.

Abstract

The Minimal Abnormality strategy (see [Bat86a]) is here generalized to the predicative level and applied to Priest's paraconsistent logic LP. It is argued that classical reasoning is recaptured whenever it is sensible from a dialetheist's point of view.

A different generalization of the Minimal Abnormality strategy to the predicative level is presented in [Bat99b], a criticism of Priest's generalization in [Bat99c].

Reassurance is first introduced here (see [Bat00a] for Strong Reassurance).

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[PM08] [bibitem]
Giuseppe Primiero and Joke Meheus. Majority merging by adaptive counting. Synthese, 165:203-223, 2008.

Adaptive characterization of belief merging protocols---see [KPP02].

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[PMnt] [bibitem]
Dagmar Provijn and Joke Meheus. Direct dynamic proofs for classical compatibility. Logique et Analyse, in print.

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[Str] [bibitem]
Christian Stra\sser. An adaptive logic for rational closure. Forthcoming.

Adaptive characterization of the rational consequence relation from

Abstract

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[SS] [bibitem]
Christian Stra\sser and Dunja Seselja. An adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation. Forthcoming.

Adaptive characterization of the abstract argumentation framework from

Abstract

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[Van97] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. Ambiguity-adaptive logic. Logique et Analyse, 159:261-280, 1997. Appeared 1999.

Abstract
The opinion that the strict formalism of formal logics is not able to capture the flexibility of natural languages, is widespread but not quite correct. The adaptive logics developed by Diderik Batens capture in a natural but strictly formal way meaning change of logical constants. The ambiguity-adaptive logic presented in this paper deals in an analogous way with meaning change of non-logical terms.

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[Van00b] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. HL2. An inconsistency-adaptive and inconsistency-resolving logic for general statements that might have exceptions. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 10:317-338, 2000.

Abstract
The present paper offers a new approach to non-monotonic logics and their reconstruction in terms of inconsistency-adaptive logics. By applying a special technique, universally quantified formulas are assigned instances that, given the paraconsistent framework, do not cause triviality even if they conflict with knowledge deriving from other sources. From the special instances, the usual instances may be derived conditionally, viz. provided they are not contradicted by statements derived with a higher preference ranking.

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[Van00a] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. Preferences as inconsistency-resolvers: the inconsistency-adaptive logic PRL. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 8:47-63, 2000. Appeared 2002.

Abstract
In this paper I generalize the new approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that was presented in [Van00b]. This generalization results in the inconsistency-adaptive logic PRL (PR stands for preference-based reliability strategy). I give proof theory, semantics, mention interesting properties, and comment on the reconstruction and amelioration of other nonmonotonic logics and mechanisms.

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[Van99] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. Minimizing ambiguity and paraconsistency. Logique et Analyse, 165-166:139-160, 1999. Appeared 2002.

Abstract
Ambiguity-adaptive logics offer a natural and rich formal solution to (possibly) inconsistent theories. Three views on `ambiguities' result in three different, intuitively correct ambiguity-adaptive logics with interesting applications. We present their semantics and proof theory, and illustrate that ambiguity-adaptive logics form an excellent alternative to paraconsistent logics that focus on the characteristics of the logical constants.

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[Van02] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. Ontological causes of inconsistency, and a change-adaptive, logical solution. In Carnielli et al. [CCLD02], pages 151-165.

Abstract
This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between 'the object a' and 'the object a at a given moment'. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion 'periods of invariance'. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.

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[Van03] [bibitem]
Guido Vanackere. Change in individuals without a name. Contextual indicators and the free change-adaptive logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11/12:213-230, 2003.

Abstract
Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solves ---partly--- the (classical) non-logical presuppositions with respect to `the existence of individuals'. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here presented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.

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[VM94] [bibitem]
Joachim Van Meirvenne. Indexed inconsistency-adaptive logic. Logique et Analyse, 145:41-55, 1994. Appeared 1996.

Abstract

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[Ver0xa] [bibitem]
Peter Verdée. Adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are \Pi^1_1-complex. Synthese, 200x. Forthcoming. fulltext

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[Ver0xb] [bibitem]
Peter Verdée. A proof procedure for adaptive logics. Forthcoming, 200x.

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[Ver01] [bibitem]
Liza Verhoeven. All premisses are equal, but some are more equal than others. Logique et Analyse, 173-174-175:165-188, 2001. Appeared 2003. [scan]

Abstract
This paper proposes two adaptive approaches to inconsistent prioritized belief bases. Both approaches rely on a selection mechanism, that is not applied to the premises as they stand, but to the consequence sets of the belief levels. One is based on classical compatibility, the other on the modal logic T of Feys. For both approaches the two main strategies of inconsistency adaptive logics are formulated: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy. All four systems are compared and found useful.

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[Ver03b] [bibitem]
Liza Verhoeven. Proof theories for some prioritized consequence relations. Logique et Analyse, 183-184:325-344, 2003. appeared 2005. [scan]

Abstract
Handling a possibly inconsistent prioritized belief base can be done in terms of consistent subsets. Humans do not compute consistent subsets, they just start reasoning and when confronted with inconsistencies in the course of their reasoning, they may adjust their interpretation of the information. In logics this behaviour corresponds to the mechanisms of dynamic proof theories. The aim of this paper is to transform known consequence relations for inconsistent prioritized belief bases in terms of consistent subsets, into dynamic proof theories that are a more faithful representation of human reasoning processes.

The prioritized Rescher--Manor consequence relations, as surveyed for example in [BDP99], are characterized here in terms of adaptive logics.

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[VHar] [bibitem]
Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten. On the sense of eating strawberries or on the exclusivity implicature of ’or’. Studia Logica, to appear.

Abstract
This paper is a contribution to the program of constructing formal representations of pragmatic aspects of human reasoning. We propose a formalization within the framework of Adaptive Logics of the exclusivity implicature governing the connective 'or'.

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