

# Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions

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# Outline

- 1 Conceptual Background
- 2 Modal contextual type theory
- 3 Conclusions

# 1 Conceptual Background

## 2 Modal contextual type theory

### 3 Conclusions

# Reasoning by Open Assumptions

- **Task:** a constructive reading of the formula

$$A \text{ true}[x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n]$$

based on open assumptions

(= not abstracted from given constructions);

- **Objectives:**
  - ▶ Natural reasoning, assumptions without strict justification;
  - ▶ Computational processes with partial information (e.g. partial evaluation: a function considers part of its input code as given).
- **Logical Take:** express epistemic states in terms of modalities.

# References

- Approaches for the connection between modalities and provability:
  - ▶ **Sequential approach** – [Sambin, Valentini (1982)]
  - ▶ **Curry-Howard correspondance** – [Bellin et al. (2001)]
  - ▶ **Intuitionistic Semantics for Modal Logic** – [Williamson (1992)], [Simpson (1994)], [Bierman, de Paiva (2000)], [Alechina et al. (2001)]
  - ▶ **Provability and Logic of Proofs** – [Artemov (2001)], [Kramer (2008)].
  - ▶ **Type theories and Constructive Modalities:** [Pfenning, Davies (2001)], [Davies, Pfenning (2001)], [Nanevski et al. (2008)].

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# Type Theory with judgmental modalities

- We present a type theory including modal operators with judgmental scope;
- Additional judgments of the theory:
  - ▶ “it is necessary that proposition  $A$  is true” –  $\Box(A \text{ true})$ ;
  - ▶ “it is possible that proposition  $A$  is true” –  $\Diamond(A \text{ true})$ .
- Using modalities to express epistemic states (in particular to model the contextual basis of propositional contents);
- Separated treatment of constructions and assumptions:
  - ▶ categorical fragment;
  - ▶ assumption-based fragment.



# Modalities and Conditions

- 'A is true' is necessary:
  - ▶ 'A is true' is known;
  - ▶ Proof-conditions for  $A$  are actually satisfied;
  - ▶ The context of assumptions for  $A$  *true* has been emptied;
  - ▶  $A$  *true* holds under any context extension  $\emptyset, \Delta$ .
  
- 'A is true' is possible:
  - ▶ 'A is true' can be known;
  - ▶ Proof-conditions for  $A$  are satisfiable;
  - ▶  $A$  holds up to refutation of its conditions;
  - ▶ cf. Kolmogorov's 'pseudo-truths' and Pfenning's 'proof irrelevance';
  - ▶ There is a non-empty context of assumptions for  $A$  *true*;
  - ▶  $A$  *true* holds under some context extension  $\Gamma, \Delta$ .

# Structure of the language

- polymorphic language:
  - ▶  $\mathcal{K} : \{type, type_{inf}\}$ ;
  - ▶ constructive truth ( $true$ );
  - ▶ weaker truth up to refutation ( $true^*$ );
- $type$ -constructors composed by listing, application, abstraction and pairing for  $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \forall, \exists$ ;
- $\rightarrow$  is material implication: a  $\lambda$ -term presented *together with* one of its  $\alpha$ -terms;
- $type_{inf}$ : admissible  $A$  from  $\neg(A \rightarrow \perp)$  to  $x : A$ ;
- $\supset$  is functional implication: abstraction on the admissible construction for the antecedent.

# Categorical Fragment

## Definition (Type and Truth Formation)

Standard type introduction rule and constructive definition of truth with Reflexivity, Symmetry and Transitivity on types (omitted for brevity):

$$\frac{a:A}{A:\text{type}} \quad \text{Type formation}$$

$$\frac{a:A}{A \text{ true}} \quad \text{Truth Definition}$$

## Categorical Fragment (2)

### Definition (Typing Rules)

$$\frac{a:A \quad b:B}{(a,b):A \wedge B \text{ true}} I_{\wedge}$$

$$\frac{a:A}{l(a):A \vee B \text{ true}} \text{ Left } I_{\vee} \quad \frac{b:B}{r(b):A \vee B \text{ true}} \text{ Right } I_{\vee}$$

$$\frac{a:A \quad A \text{ true} \vdash b:B}{a(b):A \rightarrow B \text{ true}} I_{\rightarrow} \text{ (Implication)}$$

$$\frac{a_1:A_1, \dots, a_n:A_n \quad [A_i \text{ true}] \vdash b:B \quad \lambda((a_i(b))A, B)}{(\forall a_i:A_i)B \text{ type}} I_{\forall}$$

$$\frac{a_1:A_1, \dots, a_n:A_n \quad [a_i:A_i] \vdash b:B \quad (\langle a_i, b \rangle, A, B)}{(\exists a_i:A_i)B \text{ type}} I_{\exists}$$

$$\frac{a:A}{\neg A \rightarrow \perp} I_{\perp}$$

# Interpreting Assumptions

## Definition (Informational Type and Weak Truth Formation)

An *information type*  $type_{inf}$  is constructed by running a test over the finite set of given derivations to check that no construction for  $A \rightarrow \perp$  is given:

$$\frac{\neg(A \rightarrow \perp)}{A \text{ type}_{inf}} \quad \text{Informational Type formation}$$

$$\frac{A \text{ type}_{inf} \quad x:A}{A \text{ true}^*} \quad \text{Hypothetical Truth Definition}$$

# Interpreting Assumptions (2)

## Definition (Typing Rules)

- $B$  is true up to a refutation of  $A$  true:

$$\frac{A \text{ type}_{inf} \quad x:A \vdash b:B}{x:A \vdash B \text{ true}^*} \quad \text{Function Formation}$$

- standard dependent functional construction (abstraction):

$$\frac{A \text{ type}_{inf} \quad x:A \vdash B \text{ true}^*}{((x)b) : A \supset B \text{ true}} \quad \text{Functional Abstraction}$$

- translation to standard dependent type formation (application):

$$\frac{A \text{ type}_{inf} \quad x:A \vdash B \text{ true}^* \quad a:A}{(x(b))(a) = b[a/x] : B \text{ type}[a/x]} \quad \beta\text{-conversion}$$

# Modal Extension

## Definition (Start Rules)

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, a : A, \Delta \vdash A \text{ true}} \quad \text{Premise Rule}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, x : A, \Delta \vdash A \text{ true}^*} \quad \text{Hypothesis Rule}$$

$$\frac{a : A}{\Box(A \text{ true})} \quad \Box - \text{Formation}$$

$$\frac{x : A}{\Diamond(A \text{ true})} \quad \Diamond - \text{Formation}$$

# Generalized Contextual Format

## Definition (Necessitation Context)

For any context  $\Gamma$ , the global context  $\Box\Gamma$  is given by  $\bigcup\{\Box(A_1 \text{ true}), \dots, \Box(A_n \text{ true})\}$ .

## Definition (Normal Context)

For any context  $\Gamma$ , the local context  $\Diamond\Gamma$  is given by  $\bigcup\{\circ(A_1 \text{ true}), \dots, \circ(A_n \text{ true}) \mid \circ = \{\Box, \Diamond\}\}$  and for at least one  $A_i$  it holds  $\circ = \Diamond$ .

# Modal Rules

## Definition (Introduction and Elimination for $\Box$ )

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \text{ true}}{\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box(A \text{ true})} \quad I_{\Box}$$

$$\frac{\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box(A \text{ true}) \quad \Delta, a:A \vdash b:B}{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash B \text{ true}} \quad E_{\Box}$$

# Modal Rules

## Definition (Introduction and Elimination for $\Box$ )

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \text{ true}}{\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box(A \text{ true})} \quad I_{\Box}$$
$$\frac{\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box(A \text{ true}) \quad \Delta, a:A \vdash b:B}{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash B \text{ true}} \quad E_{\Box}$$

## Definition (Introduction and Elimination for $\Diamond$ )

$$\frac{\Gamma, x:A \vdash B \text{ true}^*}{\Box \Gamma, \Diamond(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})} \quad I_{\Diamond}$$
$$\frac{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash A \text{ true}^* \quad \Box \Gamma, \Diamond(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})}{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash B \text{ true}^*} \quad E_{\Diamond}$$

# Substitution on Terms and Truth

## Theorem (Substitution on truth predicates)

- 1 If  $\Gamma, x:A, \Delta \vdash B \text{ true}^*$  and  $\Gamma, \Delta \vdash a:A$ , then  $\Gamma, \Delta \vdash [x/a]B \text{ true}$ .
- 2 If  $\Box\Gamma, \Diamond(A \text{ true}), \Box\Delta \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})$  and  $\Box\Gamma, \Box\Delta \vdash \Box(A \text{ true})$ , then  $\Box\Gamma, \Box\Delta \vdash \Box(B \text{ true})$ .

where  $[x/A]B$  is the substitution of occurrences of  $x$  in  $B$  by  $a$  (proven by induction and the Premise Rule) and the modal part is induced from the Modal Introduction Rules.

# Structural Rules (1)

## Theorem (Weakening)

- 1 If  $\Gamma \vdash B \text{ true}$ , then  $\Gamma, a:A \vdash B \text{ true}$ .
- 2 If  $\Gamma \vdash B \text{ true}^*$ , then  $\Gamma, x:A \vdash B \text{ true}^*$ .
- 3 If  $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Box(B \text{ true})$ , then  $\Box\Gamma, \Box(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Box(B \text{ true})$ .
- 4 If  $\Diamond\Gamma \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})$ , then  $\Diamond\Gamma, \Diamond(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})$ .

## Theorem (Contraction)

- 1 If  $\Gamma, a_1:A, a_2:A \vdash B \text{ true}$ , then  $\Gamma, a:A \vdash [a_1 \approx a_2/a]B \text{ true}$ .
- 2 If  $\Gamma, x_1:A, x_2:A \vdash B \text{ true}^*$ , then  $\Gamma, x:A \vdash [x_1 \approx x_2/x]B \text{ true}^*$ .
- 3 If  $\Box\Gamma, a_1:A, a_2:A \vdash \Box(B \text{ true})$ , then  $\Box\Gamma, \Box(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Box(B \text{ true})$ .
- 4 If  $\Box\Gamma, x_1:A, x_2:A \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})$ , then  $\Box\Gamma, \Diamond(A \text{ true}) \vdash \Diamond(B \text{ true})$ .

# Structural Rules (2)

## Theorem (Exchange)

- 1 If  $\Gamma, a_1 : A, a_2 : A \vdash B$  true, then  $\Gamma, a_2 : A, a_1 : A \vdash B$  true.
- 2 If  $\Gamma, x_1 : A, x_2 : A \vdash B$  true\*, then  $\Gamma, x_2 : A, x_1 : A \vdash B$  true\*.
- 3 If  $\Box \Gamma, a_1 : A, a_2 : A \vdash \Box(B$  true), then  $\Box \Gamma, a_2 : A, a_1 : A \vdash \Box(B$  true).
- 4 If  $\Box \Gamma, x_1 : A, x_2 : A \vdash \Diamond(B$  true), then  $\Box \Gamma, x_2 : A, x_1 : A \vdash \Diamond(B$  true).

# Local Soundness and Completeness

- Soundness by local reduction and expansion on  $\Box(A \text{ true})$  in terms of terms substitution;
- Completeness by local expansion on  $\Box(A \text{ true})$  with a side condition on multiple simultaneous substitutions on contexts;
- Soundness by local reduction on  $\Diamond(A \text{ true})$  in terms of the use of the Hypothesis Rule;
- Completeness by local expansion on  $\Diamond(A \text{ true})$ .

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- Weakening of the truth-values model
  - ▶ the poset  $\{1, 0\}$  that satisfies inhabitness and intensional identity;
- types as pairs  $A = [a, \rightarrow]$ , with  $a$  the verification term and  $\rightarrow$  the evaluation function:
  - ▶  $A = [a, \rightarrow] = \{1\}$  if  $x \rightarrow a = 1$  and  $A: type = 1$
  - ▶  $A = [a, \rightarrow] = \emptyset$  if  $x \rightarrow a = \text{undefined}$  and  $A: type_{inf} = 1$
  - ▶  $A = [a, \rightarrow] = \{0\}$  if  $x \rightarrow a = 0$  and  $A: type = 0$
- $type_{inf}$  admits undefinability:
  - ▶ preserving only symmetricity;
  - ▶ inhabitness is not guaranteed ('super-modest types');
- Semantics of  $cKT_{\square, \diamond}$  obtained by a composed set of (non-standard) Kripke models  $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{L}^{ver} \cup \mathcal{L}^{inf})$ .

# Remarks and Open Issues





- Modal type theory for refutable contents
  - ▶ allows constructive systems in knowledge representation;
  - ▶ applications in non-monotonic knowledge processes by data retraction;
  - ▶ automatic reasoning for systems including misinformation;
- Multi-staged information processes:
  - ▶ obtained by adding a multi-modal format and a signature system;
  - ▶ implement security and reliability relations;
    - ★ Trusted Communications ([Primiero, Taddeo (2010)])
    - ★ Data Accessibility in Networks for Distributed Computing ([Primiero (2010)]).



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